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Abstract
The wireless capabilities of modern Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) make them vulnerable to security attacks. One
prominent attack, which has disastrous consequences for the patient’s wellbeing, is the battery Denial-of-Service attack
whereby the IMD is occupied with continuous authentication requests from an adversary with the aim of depleting its battery.
Zero-Power Defense (ZPD), based on energy harvesting, is known to be an excellent protection against these attacks. This
paper raises essential design considerations for employing ZPD techniques in commercial IMDs, offers a critical review of
ZPD techniques found in literature and, subsequently, gives crucial recommendations for developing comprehensive ZPD
solutions.
Keywords Implantable medical device · IMD · Energy harvesting · Wireless power transfer · Zero-power defense ·
Authentication protocol · Denial-of-service attack · Battery DoS · Battery-depletion attack
1 Introduction
Implantable medical devices (IMDs) such as cardiac pace-
makers and defibrillators, neurostimulators, infusion pumps
and more, are battery-powered devices with extremely high
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safety, reliability and availability constraints. The typical
operational lifetime of these autonomous devices is around
a decade or so while implanted in the patient’s body. Almost
all of these devices are nowadays equipped with wireless
connectivity via a transceiver in order to support and com-
plement their treatment capabilities. They can communicate
with an external reader (Fig. 1) for, e.g., monitoring patient
health, updating IMD settings, and so on. However, and
despite their benefits, such communication capabilities open
the door to malicious use for stealing private patient data,
effecting mis-diagnosis, or even causing physical harm. An
attacker can cause physical harm either by changing the
IMD functionality (e.g., by managing to send incorrect com-
mands) or through a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. One
such attack is the battery-depletion (or battery-DoS) attack
where the attacker can force the IMD to continuously run
an energy-consuming operation, which ultimately results in
power loss and IMD shutdown. As indicated in an exhaus-
tive IMD-threat-modeling analysis in [47], battery DoS is
one of the easiest to mount and highly effective attacks. This
is also backed by the majority of the ethical-hacking efforts
in which the batteries of commercial IMDs were depleted
using black-box approaches [16, 32].
It is considered that the only robust way of protecting
an IMD against a battery DoS is by running the above-
mentioned (energy-consuming) authentication operation
using only free harvested energy. It can be argued that
J Sign Process Syst
Figure 1 A Reader/IMD system.
there is no necessity for this zero-power defense (ZPD)
mechanism since technology exists to wirelessly charge
IMD batteries when they are running low (as discussed
in Section 2, next). However, this recharging feature is
only available in less critical IMDs, such as spinal-cord
stimulators [1, 36]. For critical devices such as pacemakers,
there is a reluctance among the medical community to give
recharging responsibility to the patients, in order to avoid
patient errors. Moreover, the physicians prefer to replace
the whole IMD after a certain period to get the latest
technology [25]. Besides, even by assuming that all IMDs
have this capability, the attacker can still drain the battery
before the patient or doctor has a chance to recharge it.
Energy harvesting is a widely used concept employed
in a variety of devices including RFIDs. However, ZPD
for IMDs introduces new challenges that do not apply in
other domains. Even though there are quite a few ZPD
implementations proposed in literature, to the best of our
knowledge this paper is the first to facilitate the transition
from concept to industry-compliant ZPD designs for IMDs.
Based on a clear-cut set of design considerations, we survey
and evaluate the current state of the art and proceed to
propose specific recommendations for enhancing existing
IMDs. Essentially, this work makes the following novel
contributions:
– We consolidate ZPD design considerations for the
specific domain of IMDs.
– We perform a survey of existing systems and highlight
their limitations based on the above considerations.
– We provide recommendations in order to develop
comprehensive protection of IMDs against battery-DoS
attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide
a brief background on the use of energy harvesting in
IMDs in Section 2, and then provide motivation for using
it to enhance IMD security in Section 3. In Section 4,
we provide detailed ZPD design considerations. Based on
these considerations, we review and evaluate state-of-the-
art ZPD solutions in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide
Figure 2 Battery-DoS attack: continuous traversal of the different
transceiver modes and the authentication protocol.
recommendations for improving ZPD designs. We conclude
the discussion in Section 7.
2 Energy Harvesting in IMDs
The use of energy harvesting in IMDs is not new.
The application of this concept, however, has been very
narrow in this domain, i.e., in wireless power transfer
(WPT)1 to recharge IMD batteries. For instance, there are
several rechargeable neurostimulators that are commercially
available [1, 36]. In this specific category of implants there
is a rising trend towards increased IMD-power requirements
due to recent advances in neuromodulation-related pain
relief. For such power-hungry devices, a non-rechargeable
battery would result in a very short IMD lifespan and
subsequently require expensive surgeries in order to replace
the battery-depleted implants. One way of avoiding this
is to use larger battery sizes, which can quickly become
impractical to implant. Hence, the natural solution is to
use rechargeable systems, which can prevent the need for
frequent surgeries and would result in smaller battery sizes
and implants as a whole [37].
3 Energy Harvesting for Battery-DoS
Protection
During normal IMD operation, the RF transceiver usually
polls for an external entity by cycling through sleep and
sniff modes [38]. The (short-duration) sniff mode consumes
relatively little power compared to active transceiver
operation. If the transceiver detects RF energy, it switches to
its active mode in order to receive data. Battery-DoS attacks
1The term energy harvesting generally refers to harvesting energy
from ambient sources, whereas WPT refers to the intentional transfer
of energy from a dedicated charging device [5]. In this paper, we use
the terms interchangeably.
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Figure 3 A typical WPT
System (RF Energy Harvesting).
basically change the sleep-awake periods of both the IMD
transceiver and the internal processor, as shown in Fig. 2.
Battery-DoS attacks can generally happen in two ways
[13]: (1) They can increase the IMD activity by sending
bogus communication packets. As an example, the attacker
can repeatedly request the IMD to establish a secure channel
using incorrect credentials. Consequently, the IMD will run
part of an energy-consuming authentication protocol for
analyzing every request, which will drain the battery. (2)
The attacker can also generate electromagnetic (EM) noise
in order to cause high error rates at the IMD transceiver,
which in turn increases its energy consumption due to
increased number of retransmissions. This increased noise
may also force the IMD to increase the transmission power,
which also reduces battery life.
In light of the fact that energy harvesting has already been
employed by some classes of IMDs, the use of this concept,
in the form of ZPD, has now become quintessential to
protecting all IMDs against battery DoS. In this scheme, the
IMD, while authenticating the external entity that is trying
to communicate, can run the energy-consuming security
primitives using the RF energy harvested from the incoming
communication messages. The IMD is allowed to use the
battery for subsequent operations only after the entity is
authenticated. This prevents the IMD from depleting its
battery to entertain continuous bogus messages from a
malicious entity.
4 Design Considerations
In this section, we enumerate and discuss various consider-
ations that should be taken into account when approaching
the design of an IMD-specific ZPD system.
4.1 Choice of WPT Technique
Since ZPD is based on the concept of wireless energy
harvesting, it is important to briefly discuss the WPT
techniques that enable such strategies. A typical WPT setup
is shown in Fig. 3 [22, 29]. State-of-the-art IMD-specific
WPT techniques can be broadly categorized into three
types2 [2]:
4.1.1 Inductive Coupling (IC)
Near-field or magnetostatic WPT is usually categorized as
inductive coupling or inductive power transfer (IPT). IPT
usually involves the use of two coupled coils that have the
same inductance. The transmitter coil is placed outside the
body. When an AC current passes through it, voltage is
induced due to electromagnetic induction in the receiver
coil, which is located inside the body. IPT is the dominant
method that is used to wirelessly recharge commercial
IMDs, specifically neurostimulators [1, 36].
4.1.2 Radio Frequency (RF)
If the transfer is in the transition region (mid field) [18] or
far field, then the WPT system is usually categorized as RF
or electromagnetic power transfer (RFPT). Here, antennas
are not just limited to coils for the transmission of power. A
typical RFPT system is shown in Fig. 3.
4.1.3 Acoustic/Ultrasound
This WPT category harvests acoustic waves, which are
usually at ultrasound frequencies. In acoustic power transfer
(APT), the transmitter node, while in contact with the
skin, generates these waves using a piezoelectric transducer.
These waves induce charge differences on a piezoelectric
device in the receiver node, which is located inside the body
along with the IMD.
The advantages and drawbacks of the three WPT
techniques are summarized in Table 1 in terms of operating
range, potential biological effects, amount of transferred
2Note that this classification is not universal.
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Table 1 Comparison of WPT techniques.
Technique Range Biological Transferred Receiver
effects power size
IPT − − + −
RFPT + − − +
APT −∗ + + +
+/−: relatively good/poor performance, ∗: requires (non-air) medium
power and receiver area. The choice of WPT scheme and
associated transferred-power amount has an impact on the
real-time IMD performance, and also on the size of the
energy reservoir and, subsequently, the IMD as a whole.
This is further discussed in the subsequent sections.
4.2 Medical-Safety Constraints
The ZPD technique should satisfy the various requirements
by the FDA, FCC, IEEE, etc., in order to prevent any
adverse biological effects on human tissue due to excess
electromagnetic-energy exposure. IEEE puts constraints
on the intensity of RF signals and defines maximum-
permissible-exposure (MPE) limits for magnetic and
electric fields [21]. In addition to RF-signal intensity, the
signal frequency has a significant impact on the amount
of energy absorbed in the human tissue and the resulting
potential to cause harm. This absorption is characterized by
the specific absorption rate (SAR), which is expressed in W
kg
or mW
kg
. The peak-spatial-average SAR values for exposure
of the public and controlled environments are 2 W
kg
and 10
W
kg
, respectively (over 10 g of tissue) [21]. The FDA also
has guidelines regarding intensity of acoustic signals in W
cm2
,
namely spatial peak temporal average intensity (ISPTA)
and spatial peak pulse average intensity (ISPPA) [12].
Satisfying these constraints impacts the choice of WPT
scheme (as discussed in Section 4.1).
4.3 Frequency-Band Constraints
Certain FCC constraints also need to be met in order to
avoid IMD-radio interference with other devices operating
in the same frequency band. For example, the MedRadio
band, which is reserved for IMD communication, does not
allow an equivalent isotropically radiated power (EIRP) of
more than 25 μW [11]. Since this amount of power is too
small for WPT (as will be discussed in Section 6.3), a
separate band should be used for power transfer, whereas
the MedRadio band can be used for data communication.
This implies increased cost and size due to the use of
two antennas. One solution could be to use a single
ISM-band (13.56 MHz) antenna for both WPT and data
communication, however this would result in lower data
rates due to smaller allowed bandwidth than that of
MedRadio [33].
4.4 Real-time Behavior
Harvested power needs to stay above the consumed power
in order for the energy consumers to work seamlessly.
Otherwise, an energy reservoir must be employed so as
to collect sufficient energy before the IMD can use it.
Technically, due to this reservoir, the ZPD scheme should
always work, but the charging delay limits usability and
real-time behavior, which can be critical in the case of
emergencies. The ZPD scheme should never slow down a
paramedic access and jeopardize patient safety as a result.
4.5 Choice of Energy Reservoir
Either a supercapacitor (supercap) or a rechargeable battery
can be employed as the energy reservoir. Supercaps in
general have a longer lifespan and support more recharge
cycles than batteries [30], and thus are more suitable
for IMDs. Employing a supercap, can limit the range of
applied charging voltage, since these components have low
operating-voltage limits. Also, as indicated in [23], the
capacitor size has to incorporate the losses due to the
decoupling capacitors connected to the energy consumers.
4.6 PassiveWireless Communication
Passive communication relies on WPT schemes in order
to function without the need of an on-board power supply.
This concept forms the basis of ZPD strategies, which will
be discussed in Section 5. The most critical component
of these passive devices is the wireless transceiver that
can lead to significant peak power consumption based on
the design choice. Based on the choice of transmitter,
which subsequently impacts the receiver implementation,
we categorize these devices into four schemes, as depicted
in Fig. 4. The different schemes at the leaf nodes of
the tree are numbered accordingly and are subsequently
explained. The first part of the scheme name indicates
the type of wireless communication whereas the suffix
indicates whether the communication shares the power-
transfer-signal frequency band (PB) or uses an independent
band (IB).
4.6.1 ActiveTX-IB
The passive device has an active transceiver, i.e., it actively
transmits (using supply from the energy reservoir) instead of
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Figure 4 Classification of passive communication devices in terms of
transmitter implementation.
reflecting the incident RF signal, as shown in Fig. 5a. This
scheme is employed by the design in [46].
4.6.2 IC-PB
The downlink (reader to passive device) communication
uses the same signal that is used for inductive power
Figure 5 Schematics of
different passive communication
schemes for ZPD.
transfer, which lies in the low- or high-frequency band
(LF-HF). For the uplink, the electrical properties of
the inductive coil are changed (by load modulation; in
this case, Load Shift Keying), which affects the same
inductive-coupling field, and is thus detected by the
reader (see Fig. 5b). The design in [3] employs this
scheme.
4.6.3 EMB-PB
Compared to the previous scheme, RF/Electromagnetic
backscattering (EMB), which reflects the incident RF, is
used for data transmission instead of inductive coupling.
Here, the incident RF is used for both energy harvesting
and data communication (see Fig. 5b). The RF is reflected
if the load across the antenna feed-point is minimum, and
vice versa. One of the works that employ this scheme
is [45]. The use of EMB helps eliminate the high peak
power consumption of a conventional RF transmitter.
This is important for passive devices because, even to
transmit just a few bits of data, the peak power may
exceed the incoming power, which will result in device
malfunction in the absence of a reservoir. Note that the
use of EMB for transmission is fully beneficial only if
a simple and low-power circuit is used for the receive
path, such as an Amplitude-Shift-Keying (ASK) envelope
detector.
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4.6.4 EMB-IB
Compared to EMB-PB, here the difference is that the WPT
signal is different from the one used for EMB (as shown in
Fig. 5c). The design in [29] uses this scheme.
ActiveTX-IB and EMB-IB offer the most flexibility since
they use separate antennas for WPT and data communica-
tion. As discussed in Section 4.3, these configurations are
helpful in meeting the FCC constraints while maintaining
both the sufficient power transfer and data rates. On the
other hand, IC-PB and EMB-PB are more economical in
terms of resources since they only employ one antenna [33].
This comes, however, at the cost of reduced flexibility in
terms of data rate.
4.7 Fundamental Security Services
ZPD schemes primarily address Availability from the
CIANA security services [47]: Confidentiality, Integrity,
Authentication, Non-repudiation and Availability. Ensuring
the first four services can have an indirect impact on
Availability. As an example, if the IMD has a dedicated
processor that is responsible for authenticating an external
entity, the peak-power consumption of the implant will
increase when this peripheral is active. As a result, the bogus
messages sent by an attacker will draw more energy from
the battery than in the case of a less-secure IMD. Hence,
ensuring one service should not be at the expense of the
other.
The choice of cryptographic primitives, which are needed
to provide these services, plays a critical role in the design
of the energy-harvesting circuit. For example, lightweight
block ciphers are preferred candidates for achieving
data confidentiality because of their low energy profile.
Moreover, in order to achieve integrity and authentication, a
cipher-based Message Authentication Code (MAC) should
be used instead of a hash-based MAC (HMAC) because
of lower energy consumption in software implementations.
For dedicated hardware implementations, however, this is
not always the case [40]. Furthermore, for these systems,
mutual authentication should be employed instead of just
authenticating the reader unilaterally. This is required to
prevent spoofing attacks on the reader [50]. This implies
that the harvested energy should be able to support both
transmission and reception of data.
In addition to battery DoS, satisfying availability also
implies providing protection against a second class of DoS
attack on IMDs, which we call function DoS [50]. This
type of DoS floods the IMD with communication requests
in order to prevent it in performing its main medical
functionality. It follows that a security architecture that
ensures implant availability should protect against both
battery and function DoS.
4.8 Device Usability
The ZPD design should not result in an awkward usage or
programming of the IMD. For instance, a (short range) IPT-
based access does not result in patient inconvenience in case
of a pacemaker. However, such a close-range access may
not be acceptable to the patient in case of a neurostimulator
implanted within the skull. For instance, a patient may avoid
frequent IMD access in public if it requires placing the
reader interface on their head. This can significantly impact
the patient’s social life and can lead to social segregation.
4.9 Maintainability
The ZPD design involves executing cryptographic mecha-
nisms in order to authenticate the external entities. In the
event of discovering a security loophole or an implemen-
tation bug, the cryptographic primitives and/or the security
protocol require replacement or an update. In the case of
IMDs, the first requirement is that such updates should
be possible at the firmware level using the wireless inter-
face, otherwise hardware updates or modifications imply
device explantation via surgery. Another requirement is
that such firmwares should be decoupled from the main
IMD functionality. This expedites the firmware-certification
cycle. Updating a monolithic IMD firmware, which includes
both the medical application and the security functional-
ity, is highly likely to result in a longer certification cycle
compared to a decoupled firmware.
4.10 Dependability
IMDs are safety-critical systems, which have extreme safety
and reliability (cumulatively; dependability) constraints. A
ZPD design introduces additional electronic components to
the IMD system, and each component (e.g., a transistor) has
an associated failure rate. Hence, ZPD protection should
not significantly impact the overall implant dependability.
Analysis of IMD dependability is further discussed in
Section 6.6.
4.11 Emergency Access
In the case of emergencies, the paramedics or first respon-
ders should have unhindered and fast access to the IMD,
without compromising patient safety and security. Hence,
an appropriate balance should be attained between usability,
safety and security. For instance, the authentication pro-
tocol running on harvested energy should not require a
pre-shared secret (or key) between the reader and the IMD.
Otherwise, it will not work in the case of the paramedic
reader, which will most likely not have the same key as the
implant [47]. Moreover, as discussed in Section 4.4, it is of
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paramount importance that the choice of WPT and the asso-
ciated energy reservoir results in acceptable charging delay
in order to ensure real-time performance. Otherwise, it will
block legitimate access to the IMD in emergency scenarios.
4.12 Design Suitability
Existing IMD designs take a long time from concept to
market due to rigorous certification cycles. Therefore, any
new ZPD solution should fit in seamlessly in the existing
designs resulting in minimal changes and short review
cycles. For example, technically speaking, a large energy
reservoir enables ZPD but this increases the size of the
design and introduces unnecessary delay, which impacts
suitability.
4.13 Conformity to Touch-to-access Principle
Any ZPD scheme shall ensure that only the entity in close
proximity to the patient for a prolonged period of time is
allowed to access the IMD. This touch-to-access principle
assumes that it is infeasible for the attacker to get in close
proximity since the patient would reject physical contact
with untrusted entities [43, 47].
4.14 Range of Operation
The ZPD solution shall be able to work correctly inde-
pendently of the implantation depth. Appropriate balance
should be attained between the WPT and the associated
thermal effects and energy absorption in the human tissue.
Also, the ZPD solution shall allow the provision of bedside-
base-station operation for the convenience of the patient (see
Fig. 1). This device by definition can be less than 10 feet
away from the patient [34]. However, in order to conform to
the touch-to-access principle, this communication should be
strictly limited to the bedside range (less than 5 feet away).
5 A Survey of Existing ZPD Techniques
In light of the design considerations discussed in Section 4,
we now survey works from literature and discuss their
limitations. We hope that this survey will help us reflect
on and validate the design considerations. These works are
presented in chronological order, and to the best of our
knowledge, are the only works pertaining to ZPD for IMDs.
5.1 Harvesting-Based Techniques
Halperin et al. [16] presented the pioneering work of
RFID-style energy harvesting for zero-power defense of
IMDs. They use an RFID module called WISP [45], which
employs EMB for the data transmission from the implant
to the reader, and simple ASK-envelop detection in the
reverse direction, while using RFPT for wireless power
transfer. Their scheme, however, does not perform mutual
authentication and its acoustic-communication-based key
transport is susceptible to attacks, as shown in [15].
The scheme from Liu et al. [28] is the only ZPD work
that takes FCC regulations into consideration. They employ
the ISM band for RFPT and the MedRadio band for data
communication. It employs a dedicated passive RFID wake-
up module, which performs RF-energy harvesting from the
incoming signal in order to authenticate the other entity.
Upon successful authentication, the main module is woken
up. This scheme uses pre-shared keys between the reader
and the IMD, which makes emergency access impossible.
This is because in emergencies, the IMD and the paramedic
reader are likely unknown to each other and therefore do not
share a key.
Strydis et al. [50] propose an IMD architecture that
isolates the implant functionality from the security tasks
by using dedicated processing cores for the respective
applications. They designed the security co-processor from
scratch, which was optimized for executing the MISTY1
cipher in terms of energy and performance. The choice of
this dual-core architecture helps in dealing with repeated
communication requests that may prevent the implant from
performing its primary task. Thus it effectively protects
against function DoS. Battery DoS is tackled by ensuring
that the security core and the transceiver run on harvested
RF energy before mutual authentication of reader/IMD.
After successful authentication, these modules are allowed
to use battery power for subsequent communication.
However, they did not present a full system implementation.
Ellouze et al. [8, 9] propose an RFID-based, energy-
harvesting solution, that uses the same WISP module
as employed by [16]. In contrast to [16], their solution
additionally provides mutual authentication. They use
cardiac-signal-based biometrics for authentication and the
generation of session keys. However, the fuzzy-vault-
inspired protocol (OPFKA) [19] employed in their scheme
is vulnerable to attacks as demonstrated in [42].
Yang et al. [53] use IPT, and employ the same coil
for power transfer and data communication. Their scheme
provides mutual authentication. However, it employs pre-
shared keys, and is thus unable to support emergency access.
Moreover, they did not implement a unified ZPD system
since the hash-based authentication was verified separately
on an FPGA.
Chang et al. [3] propose a generic ZPD solution that
is not specific to IMDs per se, however, it covers a
spectrum of devices that have more or less the same profile.
They propose IPT for the power transfer from the reader.
This signal is also used for bi-directional communication.
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However, they do not give any description of the employed
security protocol.
5.2 Non-harvesting-Based Techniques
Denning et al. [6] propose a class of defensive mechanisms,
which uses an external device, called the communication
cloaker. This device shares a secret key with the IMD,
which allows secure communication between the pair. The
defensive mechanisms vary in terms of whether the IMD
checks the presence of a cloaker periodically or if it contacts
the cloaker only when an external entity tries to access the
implant. In case the cloaker is absent, the IMD allows fail-
open access to any reader. Otherwise, the cloaker performs
the authentication of the external entity, and allows it to
communicate with the IMD in case it is authentic. Although
the proposed class provides emergency access, the authors
acknowledge that it is susceptible to jamming attacks, in
which the attacker selectively jams packets between the
cloaker-IMD pair in order to convince the IMD of the
cloaker’s absence. Additional mitigation schemes against
these attacks are briefly discussed. Another drawback of this
scheme is that it introduces an additional single point of
failure. This is because the IMD becomes unsecured in case
the patient forgets to wear the cloaker, or loses it.
Hei et al. [17] utilize the concept of anomaly detec-
tion [44] in which the system automatically detects abnor-
mal events, such as malicious access. Their scheme is based
on supervised learning in which the normal access patterns
of IMDs are used as training data. The result is then used to
classify abnormal IMD accesses in real time. Their scheme
uses an additional device (a cellphone) that performs this
real-time classification. Moreover, their scheme is designed
to block anomalous access attempts before the expensive
authentication-related computations are performed by the
IMD. When the IMD is contacted by an external device, it
asks the cellphone to classify this connection attempt. Based
on the verdict from the cellphone, the IMD either proceeds
with the authentication, or goes to sleep. One main draw-
back of their scheme is that they have neither provided a
security protocol between the IMD and the cellphone, nor
any security analysis. One highly probable attack against
this scheme is for an attacker to spoof cellphone messages
to the IMD. Moreover, this scheme is not designed to work
in an emergency scenario.
Similarly to [6], Gollakota et al. [14] propose an external
wearable device, called the shield, which listens and jams all
IMD accesses. With this friendly jamming, the scheme tries
to protect against both active and passive (eavesdropping)
attacks. In case a legitimate reader access is required, the
shield is simply removed from the patient’s proximity. The
main advantage of this solution is that it can be readily
employed in existing IMD systems. However, similar to [6],
this scheme introduces an additional single point of failure.
Moreover, they assume that the distance between the IMD
and the shield is less than the distance between the attacker
and the IMD, and hence the attacker would be unable to
perform eavesdrop attack. However, it is shown in [52]
that MIMO-based eavesdropping attacks are possible if
the attacker uses two antennas within 3 meters of the
patient [44].
5.3 Summary
Table 2 compares the above ZPD techniques based on the
various parameters and design considerations highlighted
in Section 4. We can see that all harvesting-based works
lack the evaluation of hazardous biological effects of the
employed WPT schemes. Moreover, all the techniques
do not consider the possibility of a bedside-base-station
operation, which is a rising trend in the reader/IMD systems.
They also offer insufficient security services and/or have
security vulnerabilities in one form or another.
6 Discussion and Recommendations
We, next, provide recommendations on how existing
solutions can be improved in order to better meet the design
constraints highlighted in Section 4.
6.1 Adaptive ZPD
In modern IMD setups, in addition to the doctor’s
programmer, we also have a bedside base-station, as shown
in Fig. 1. For the convenience of the patients, these
wireless devices are required to communicate with the
IMD from a few feet away [34]. With this constraint,
IPT- and APT-based ZPD cannot be used for the base-
station/IMD authentication. Hence, with this setup, it is
advantageous to employ RFPT for energy harvesting, since
it is more flexible compared to IPT and APT in terms of
range. Though the amount of power transferred through
RFPT is significantly smaller compared to IPT/APT, it
is not an issue in this specific case since the base-
station communication is only used for non-critical daily
monitoring. As a result, this setup can afford long delays
due to energy-reservoir charging. In light of the above, an
adaptive ZPD approach should be considered, that e.g., uses
IPT/APT for doctor-programmer/IMD communication, and
switches to RFPT for base-station/IMD communication. In
terms of implementation cost, it is more economical to use
IPT for programmer/IMD communication instead of APT.
This is because the same coils can potentially be employed
for near-field (programmer communication) and far-field
(base-station communication). On the other hand, the use
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of APT (for programmer communication) would require
the use of piezoelectric transducers in addition to the RF
antenna (needed for base-station communication).
6.2 Main-Implant-Battery Size
We now discuss how realistic it is to achieve battery DoS
when considering actual IMD battery sizes. The generic
components of the total IMD energy consumption are
summarized in (1) [7].
Etotal = Ecomp + Esense + Estim + ETRX (1)
Ecomp is the computational energy which includes the
energy spent by the IMD processor or MCU for medical-
related processing, and the energy spent for handling the
incoming or outgoing communication messages. Esense is
the energy consumed during the sensing of a physiological
signal from the human body. Estim is the energy spent for
electrical stimulation via the electrodes applied by the IMD
on the human tissue. Finally, ETRX is the energy consumed
by the RF transceiver.
For the calculations, it is assumed that the IMD has a
state-of-the-art ultra-low-power ARM Cortex-M0+ based
32-bit MCU [24], running at 19 MHz, and an implantable-
grade radio transceiver [38], with an effective data rate of
265 kbps. The supply voltage is set at 3.3 V. The IMD-
battery-lifetime trends with respect to example processor
duty cycles, which contribute to Ecomp and Esense, are
shown in Fig. 6. For instance, the pacemaker design in [27]
has a processor duty cycle of 5%. Moreover, the worst-
case Estim of a pacemaker is 25 μJ per heartbeat, based on
reported figures of commercial devices [7]. The duty cycle
of the transceiver is estimated at 0.21%, which corresponds
to 3 minutes of active data communication per 24 hours with
a bedside base-station [34]. The data points correspond to
actual implantable-grade battery sizes [51].
The time required to completely deplete the IMD battery
by continuously sending bogus communication packets is
illustrated in Fig. 7. On average, we assume half the charge
available in the batteries due to normal use. As a worst-case
Figure 6 IMD-battery lifetime with respect to example processor duty
cycles while the transceiver is active for 3 minutes per 24 hours.
Figure 7 Time required to completely deplete a half-full IMD battery
through battery DoS.
scenario, we also assume that the authentication steps are
executed continuously on active modes of the MCU and
the transceiver with the current consumption of 0.78 mA
and 4.9 mA, respectively. It can be deduced from these
plots that, as a first level of defense, the battery sizes for
critical applications, such as pacemakers, should be as large
as possible.
We now analyze the effect of the EM-noise attack, in
which the attacker’s aim is to cause IMD retransmissions
due to high error rates at the IMD transceiver. Based on
the analysis from Gelenbe et al. [13] of battery-DoS attacks
on sensor nodes, the IMD current consumption under an
EM-noise attack can be represented by (2).
Ia = In + rIa = In
1 − r (2)
Here, In is the average current consumption in a normal
scenario, Ia is the total average current consumption in
an attack scenario, and r is the retransmission probability
(0 ≤ r < 1). Increase in the EM-noise level is reflected
by an increase in r . Figure 8 shows the expected lifetime of
an IMD operating under realistic processor and transceiver
duty cycles of 5% and 0.21% respectively (as discussed
above). From this, we can conclude that, although the
EM-noise attack significantly affects the IMD lifetime, its
impact is less critical compared to continuously making
Figure 8 IMD-battery lifetime in the presence of an EM-noise attack
resulting in the retransmission probability r .
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Figure 9 Simple ZPD configuration.
bogus authentication attempts. This is because the amount
of RF traffic generated by the IMDs in realistic scenarios is
very low, e.g., 3 minutes per day for the above-mentioned
reader [34].
6.3 Reservoir Size and Charging Delay
If the peak power of the load is always less than the
harvested power, then we do not need a reservoir. Otherwise,
the size of the reservoir is determined by looking at the
required energy consumption of all the consumers during
the authentication operation. Moreover, if a reservoir is
required, then it may seem that any ZPD scheme might
work. However, this is not true since it can become
impractical for high-energy-consumption solutions due to
the long delay, which is required to store sufficient energy.
For capacitor reservoirs, in order to determine the
required capacitance, the energy available in the capacitor
(Ecap), should be greater than the authentication energy
(Eauth). The capacitance can be calculated using (3) [4],
where Vmax is the capacitor voltage when it is sufficiently
charged and Vmin is when it has been used by the application
or authentication process (see Fig. 9).
Ecap = 1
2
C (V 2max − V 2min) > Eauth (3)
RF-energy harvesters in general output constant power
instead of constant voltage [39]. In this type of capacitor
charging, the supplied voltage increases (instead of staying
fixed) and current decreases with increasing capacitor
voltage. The capacitor charging time3 (tch) for this type
of charging is calculated using (4) [39]. Here, Pch is
the charging power supplied by the energy harvester to
the capacitor (C), R is the capacitor’s equivalent series
resistance (ESR) and Q is the amount of coulombs stored
during this time. Here A = √Q2 + 4C2RPch.
tch =
Q2 + QA + 4C2RPch ln( A+Q√
4C2RPch
)
4CPch
(4)
If the authentication-energy consumption is reduced,
then the required reservoir capacitance can be reduced as
3The capacitor charging time for constant voltage charging is 5RC.
a result. If this value is between 0.1 μF and 470 μF, then
ceramic capacitors can be employed, which are ideal for
energy harvesting because of their low leakage current,
small size and low cost [4]. These capacitors also have a
very low ESR [10], which allows us to ignore the effect of
the time constant (RC). Hence, (4) can be simplified to (5),
which is also equivalent to (6). Here, E is the energy stored
in the capacitor.
tch = Q
2
2CPch
(5)
tch = E
Pch
(6)
The time it takes to charge an empty capacitor (tchinitial ),
and in the case of subsequent charging operations (tchrepeat )
when a capacitor has a residue voltage of Vmin can be
calculated by (7) [4]. Here, Einitial = 12CV 2max, which is the
energy attained by an empty capacitor when charged from 0
V to Vmax.
tchinitial =
Einitial
Pch
tchrepeat =
Ecap
Pch
(7)
As an example, we use the evaluation setup from
Section 6.2 and take the ISO/IEC 9798-2-based mutual
authentication protocol from the ZPD solution in [50].
We use AES-128 for data confidentiality and cipher-based
MAC. For WPT, we look at the IPT scheme from [26],
which is specifically designed for IMDs and delivers Pch =
6.15 mW. Using Vmax = 3.3 V and Vmin = 2.1 V, which
are within the operating supply voltage range of this setup
(i.e., 2.05 V to 3.5 V), we see that C for the resulting
scheme turns out to be 6.19μF (since the measuredEauth =
20.07 μJ). Using a standard ceramic capacitor of size
greater than this value e.g., 10 μF, tchinitial and tchrepeat turn
out to be 8.85 ms and 5.27 ms respectively, which are very
reasonable in terms of real-time behavior.
In general, the simplest solution is always to choose a
reservoir capacitance that is much larger than the required
value (as long as the charging delay is reasonable). This
margin is important since the authentication protocol or the
employed cryptographic primitives can change in the future,
e.g., due to security updates. However, in case C turns out to
be outside the ceramic-capacitor range due to large Eauth,
we can employ the following schemes to reduce it, and
thereby the charging delay.
6.3.1 Use of Sleep Modes
The capacitor-charging delay can be minimized by using
sleep modes and interrupts, instead of sizing the capacitor
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Figure 10 Supercapacitor
characteristics in relation to
application duty cycle (active
mode vs. sleep mode).
for the whole authentication, resulting in reduced required
capacitance. One way of achieving this could be to achieve
a minimum required voltage (VTHRH ) using a voltage-
controlled switch, before the capacitor energy is used by
the rest of the IMD (Fig. 10a). After some processing, the
implant MCU can then enter sleep mode based on a voltage-
comparator-based interrupt when the capacitor voltage (VC)
falls below a lower threshold (VTHRL). Subsequently, the
MCU can wake up4 again if another such interrupt is set at
VC > VTHRH [23]. In this case, a protocol step, such as a
MAC calculation, can have multiple processing steps.
Another way could be to go to sleep after each protocol
step in order to reduce the number of wakeups and the
associated delay at the cost of a larger capacitor. Here, the
protocol step is the same as the processing step (Fig. 10b).
In this case, the supercap size should be chosen based on the
most energy-consuming protocol step. However, this can be
problematic if such a step is changed in the future due to the
reprogramming of the IMD with a different authentication
protocol. Note that in this scheme as well the comparator
interrupt will be required to wake up the device, indicating
that the capacitor has been sufficiently charged.
4The plots in Fig. 10 do not show the wakeup-time durations for clarity.
6.3.2 Gradual Switch to Harvested Energy
In another approach, the implant can use the battery for the
first authentication request and if it fails, it can switch to
harvested energy for subsequent accesses within a specified
time-frame. This can allow for smaller reservoir sizes
since we can afford the resulting delay due to frequent
charge/discharge cycles in case of an illegal entity.
6.4 Timeouts
It can be argued that timeouts can be employed as a simpler
alternative to ZPD. For instance, after a certain number
of incorrect attempts, the IMD can be made to not accept
further messages for a certain duration. For domains other
than IMDs this can be a natural choice. However, for IMDs,
these timeouts can significantly compromise patient safety.
For instance, any timeout after a malicious access can
subsequently block a valid authentication attempt, which
impacts availability.
6.5 Standalone ZPDModule
As discussed in Section 4.12, the ZPD circuitry should
not impact the already-constrained design choices from the
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manufacturer’s perspective. When incorporating ZPD, it is
likely that the manufacturer’s preferable course of action
would be to retain most of the existing IMD design in order
to expedite regulatory approval. A solution to this problem
is to design a ZPD module that sits externally to the main
IMD core next to the antenna and is minimally invasive from
the IMD design perspective. This is shown in Fig. 11.
This module decouples the antenna from the rest of the
IMD with the help of a switch. The antenna is initially
disconnected from the IMD transceiver. Upon receiving the
incoming RF, the ZPD module is powered up using the
harvested energy and executes the authentication protocol.
When the external entity/reader is authenticated, the ZPD
module turns on the switch so that the IMD is able to
communicate with the reader in a secure manner. Upon
completion of the communication session, the ZPD module
turns off the switch. This configuration, however, poses
two new constraints: (1) There should be enough space
inside the casing for the placement of this standalone
module. (2) The antenna (or coil) used by the ZPD module
should not be obstructed by the metallic casing. Otherwise,
it can negatively impact energy harvesting and wireless
communication.
Regarding the first constraint, we observe that it is
quite common for the IMDs (e.g., [35]) to have sufficient
vacant space inside the metal casing. Regarding the second
constraint as well, we have examples of rechargeable IMDs
such as [41], which have unusually large charging coils
compared to non-rechargeable IMDs. Here, the coil is
embedded within an elastomeric plate, which is placed
outside the IMD’s titanium casing. This allows unobstructed
WPT. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the IMDs
currently in the field can accommodate a standalone ZPD
module.
As discussed in Section 3, the IMD transceiver usually
polls for an external entity by cycling through sleep and
sniff modes. Employing the above-discussed standalone
ZPD module alleviates the need for such polling, and thus,
the transceiver can completely stay asleep. However, this
implies modifying the transceiver functionality, which was
Figure 11 Standalone ZPD
module.
Figure 12 Taxonomy of ZPD implementations. Top left: single-
processor implementation. Top right: dual-processor implementation.
Bottom: standalone ZPD module with the internal IMD design
unchanged.
intended to be avoided in the first place. Thankfully, such
changes can be performed at the firmware level, which are
far less invasive than changing the transceiver circuitry.
6.6 Taxonomy of ZPD Implementations
In terms of implementing ZPD, we can have three possible
schemes, as shown in Fig. 12.
1. Single-processor ZPD (1P-ZPD): This is the most
basic implementation in which a dedicated energy-
harvesting system is added to a reference single-
processor IMD; see Fig. 3. This processor is responsible
for both executing the medical application and for
receiving/sending data packets from/to the transceiver.
This handling of data includes running the crypto
primitives in order to authenticate the external device
(using harvested energy).
2. Dual-processor ZPD (2P-ZPD): This scheme was
originally proposed in [50], in which a dedicated
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processor is added (within the IMD system) for
handling the communication data and executing the
security primitives. This helps protect the IMD against
function-DoS.
3. Standalone ZPD (S-ZPD): This type of ZPD implemen-
tation is the scheme introduced in Section 6.5. Note that
similar to 2P-ZPD, this scheme has a second processor
as well, which is inside the standalone module.
These implementations are compared in Table 3 against
a reference, non-ZPD design. Only 2P-ZPD and S-ZPD
provide protection against function-DoS since the medical
and security tasks are decoupled and executed on separate
processors. In addition, S-ZPD provides the fastest time
to market because of a significantly shorter approval cycle
of the standalone module. On the other hand, as evident
from Fig. 12, 1P-ZPD results in the lowest area overheads
compared to the other two schemes. Note, however, that 2P-
ZPD and S-ZPD do not introduce significant energy and
power costs since the authentication is performed by the
additional processors using only harvested energy and, after
authentication, these processors can enter their deepest sleep
modes, as shown in [48].
In terms of maintainability, both 2P-ZPD and S-ZPD
decouple the security-related processing from the main
implant functionality. This makes it straightforward to
update the security firmware, without the need for touching
the medical application. Hence, the potential maintainability
cost of 1P-ZPD is considerably higher than the other two
schemes.
In order to evaluate the schemes in terms of dependabil-
ity, we consider functional safety, which is based on the
industry-established meta-standard IEC 61508 [20] and has
been increasingly used for a diverse number of application
domains, ranging from cars, and planes to IMDs.
Functional safety can be calculated via such techniques
as Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). More
Table 3 Comparison of ZPD-enabled IMD designs with respect to a
base, single-processor, non-ZPD system.
1P-ZPD 2P-ZPD S-ZPD
Function-DoS protection 0 + +
Design suitability
Certification effort −− − − − −
Area cost − −− −−
Power/Energy cost − − −
Maintainability − + +
Dependability 0 0 0
(+) stands for a benefit, (−) for a drawback and (0)
for no perceptible change compared to the base design
Table 4 High-demand probability of failure per hour (PFH) for an
18-nm technology node.
PFH FITs
< 10−5/h 10000
< 10−6/h 1000
< 10−7/h 100
< 10−8/h 10
specifically and without loss of generality, we consider
here an IMD processor comprising three critical subparts:
the core, the instruction memory (FLASH) and the data
memory (SRAM). We, then, proceed to perform an FMEA
on the safety functions included in the IMD safety-critical
systems; in this case the aforementioned three subparts.
The objective is to calculate the Probability of Failure per
Hour (PFH), an absolute metric for the overall system. For
constant failure rates, PFH is given by (8):
PFH =
∑
λDU (8)
Here, λDU is the rate of dangerous undetected failures
observed. PFH encompasses a λDU per each of the sub-
components (i.e. here, IMD subparts) of the analyzed
safety function and accounts for both permanent and
transient faults. Here, we draw the λDU values of all such
components from confidential industrial data [31] in the
possession of YogiTech S.p.A., now an Intel company. This
dataset is empirically collected and pertains to an 18-nm
process technology and, hence, is relevant for future IMDs,
as well. Considering a high-demand application scenario
– since we focus on IMDs –, we can use calculated PFH
figures to also derive the well-known FIT metric (Failures
In Time) based on well-known values (see Table 4).
Based on the above, the dependability findings for the
three implementations are collected in Table 5. Since the S-
ZPDmodule is standalone, it must contain its own processor
(or MCU). Then, the amount of processing logic and
memory footprint of this scheme is similar to that of 2P-
ZPD, which is roughly double to that of 1P-ZPD. Hence,
1P-ZPD should have a lower PFH compared to the other
two schemes (assuming same processor architecture and
memories are used in all the schemes). We take as an
example a 16-bit 5-stage RISC processor with a separate 16-
kB instruction (FLASH) memory and a 16-kB data memory
Table 5 Dependability evaluation of ZPD-enabled IMD designs.
PFH FIT
1P-ZPD 4.86 × 10−8 100
2P-ZPD & S-ZPD 9.70 × 10−8 100
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(SRAM). Incorporating an additional processor (i.e., in
schemes 2P-ZPD and S-ZPD) doubles the PFH value to that
of 1P-ZPD. However, there is no change in FIT value, due
to the trivial silicon overhead involved in moving from a
single to two tiny implant processors due to the lightweight
processor designs used [50]. Hence, 2P-ZPD and S-ZPD do
not impact the IMD dependability perceptibly.
7 Conclusions
Over the last few years, energy harvesting has been
presented as the most effective solution for protecting
IMDs against battery-depletion attacks. In this paper, we
have provided an extensive review of IMD-specific ZPD
works from literature. We analyzed these works based on
our formulated design considerations, and highlighted their
shortcomings. This paper is the first to substantiate these
considerations and to provide practical recommendations
towards practical ZPD implementations. These include,
among others, the concept of adaptive ZPD with the
purpose of facilitating bedside-base-station operation, and
the standalone ZPD module with the aim of improving the
IMD-certification effort and the time to market.
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